Some of the obstacles were self- imposed, others were the result of Britain’s failure to invest in infrastructure and public services for more than 30 years. Supposedly mighty ministers pulled levers and nothing happened Sometimes they had no levers to pull Other times they chose not to pull them. The confusion became increasingly transparent, a significant shift in British political culture. As foot and mouth raged, the crisis in parts of the NHS deepened and the transport system got even worse, there was no attempt any more to affect Thatcher-like certainty. Across the political spectrum the hectoring affectation of arrogance was replaced by leaders asking openly what the heck they should do about it all.Even Labour’s second landslide election victory did not bring about a renewed self-confidence in the Government. In some ways Tony Blair’s victory was an achievement of such stratospheric proportions that no one has bothered to get giddy by reflecting on it for very long.
A party that was unelectable nine years ago now commands the political stage while the Conservatives, the most successful political party of the 20th century, whimper from the side. But the campaign had a ghostly quality at the time and seems even less clearly defined now. Labour tiptoed around the big themes – tax, public spending, the euro – while William Hague applied a sledgehammer of cartoon-like proportions. No wonder some voters felt disengaged: their political leaders were not fully engaged either.Labour’s ambiguity was not entirely a product of electoral calculation It was genuinely ambiguous on the big issues of 2001. Towards the end of the year Tony Blair reaffirmed his faith in the state-owned NHS and hinted at tax rises for the first times since he became leader. Simultaneously he talked vaguely about his belief in the private sector’s ability to revive public services. He began the year pleading with Railtrack to get its act together, but ended it realising that prime ministerial exhortation would not get the trains to run on time.
Members of Railtrack’s board rolled up to Downing Street most days in the spring and then went away again, accountable to their shareholders rather than to the Government.In October, the Secretary of State for Transport, Stephen Byers, effectively re-nationalised the privatised monopoly, but could not explain why he had done so. His spin-doctor, Jo Moore, in charge of improving his presentation in the media, had so embarrassed him that he went into hiding – unable to present his case, although he had a good one to present. Mr Byers resurfaced but was less sure-footed about answering questions on what precisely would replace Railtrack. A Government that has always been poor at presentation reached a new low – when the minister had a good story to tell he disappeared. When awkward questions were raised about the long-term consequences of the good story the minister was available on every media outlet not answering the questions.The Conservatives were even more open in their bewildered introspection. Reeling from their second landslide election defeat in a row the most Eurosceptic party in the Western world travelled to Paris, Munich, Oslo and Stockholm in search of new solutions for Britain’s public services. Look at the hospitals in France, Germany and Sweden, they proclaimed.
But they opposed the higher taxes that Europe was willing to pay for better services. They opposed the euro also, but did not dare speak about it in case they appeared as deranged fanatics.The clich? relentlessly applied in 2001, were all wrong. The Government was supposed to be a bunch of control freaks, but a lot of the time was not fully in control. The Conservatives under Iain Duncan Smith were portrayed as a bunch of right-wing fanatics, when they had no policies at all.
